MARKETING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE BY (RE)INVENTING STATES :

Professional rivalries between lawyers and economists, as hegemonic strategies on the international market for the reproduction of national States elites.

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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES IN SOUTH AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT AND SEMI-PERIPHERY

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In the last ten years, the promotion of the rule of law has become one of the essential components of the politics of international developmental assistance. Paradoxically, the rather substantial investments that have taken place both financially and professionally, according to most commentators, have not had results proportional to the amounts invested. Recurring scholarly criticisms emphasize that the enduring forces of culture and legal tradition lead to repeated failures of efforts to transplant from one system to another.

The close relationship of the legal field to the institutions of the nation state contrasts with the internationalization of the field of economics, where pretentions of a universal global science coexist with different national practices. (Fourcade-Gourinchas, Babb, 2002 ;Fourcade-Gourinchas,). The spread, content, and modes of international transfer of these two types of governing expertise depend on logics tied to the specific history of these

professional fields. That history determines how each field constructed its national autonomy, and more particularly how it supports its claim to universalism played out through active transnational networks structured around the major institutions for the production and diffusion of expertise. The role and authority of degrees and expertise gained abroad contributes to a hierarchical division of labor that in turn leads to the reproduction both of the transnational expertise and of the national elites that promote it.

It is necessary therefore to work through national histories in order to understand the market for the import and export of state expertise. The national approach is essential whether that market in the import and export of governing expertise -- such as human rights or the economic recipes for development – actually represents the beginnings of the global field of state power or whether is turns out to represent only a strategy of symbolic imperialism characterized by prescriptive discourses claiming universal value.

Working on the basis of a first line of research focused on relations between the United States and Latin America (Dezalay, Garth, 2002), we examined transfers of expertise through competitive battles between different professional elites in the North as well as the South. Our findings supported a hypothesis initially offered by Pierre Bourdieu (2002) to examine the international circulation of ideas. He pointed out that "texts circulate without their contexts," meaning that the importers of state expertise can adapt the texts according to their own positions in the field of state power. This strategy of the double game allows them to take advantage of the legitimacy of the imported expertise while using the expertise instrumentally in their local fights for power and influence.

Yet, in spite of this work of local re-interpretation, international strategies deployed in palace wars do not always lead to major institutional or professional transformations. Our empirical findings show that it is the existence of a structural homology of positions - and interests – between importers and exporters that determines the success of a particular process

of import-export. In order to present the data on which led to the formulation of this core hypothesis, we start by comparing the relatively successful transplantation of Chicago economics in Chile and other Latin American countries with the more ambivalent effects of the global campaign for human rights within this same region. Then, in a second part, we will sketch briefly some more general findings drawn from further research in Asia that allowed us to systematize our problematic on the earlier colonial genesis - and its later hegemonic restructuring - of the international markets for the import-export of competing forms of State expertise[1].

Part I

IMPORTED EXPERTISE IN LATIN-AMERICAN 'PALACE WARS'

1.1 -The 'Dollarization' of economics

The Washington consensus in the south and the north developed out of structural similarities in the position of a group of economists standing outside of the establishment. The first key ingredient was scholarly investment as a legitimating basis for what was then an "unholy alliance." The University of Chicago economists -- almost all of whom were first or second generation immigrants -- lacked the requisite social capital and connections for legitimacy and

[1] This first part is a summary presentation of some of the findings of our research, fully developped in *The Internationalization of Palace Wars : Lawyers, Economists and the Contest for Latin American States,* 2002, University of Chicago Press (translated in Spanish as *La internationalisation de las luchas por el poder* (Bogota,2002, Santiago du Chili, 2004 Mexico, 2004)). The second draws on our forthcoming book XXX, as well as other published papers "National usages for a "global" science: The dissemination of new economic paradigms as a hegemonic global strategy and a national strategy for the reproduction of governing elites" in G. Mallard, C. Paradeise, A. Peerbaye (eds.) *Global Science and National Sovereignty*, London, Routledge, 2008. « The Legal construction of a politics of Notables. The Double Game of the Patricians of the Indian Bar on the Market of Civic Virtue » *Retfaerd,* 3. 114, 2006, pp. 42-63

therefore invested in mathematics, in public choice, and in media strategies. They early formed alliances with a then-marginal group of very conservative Republicans and business people hostile to the cozy relationships that made up the establishment. The Chicago economists also developed powerful mathematical arguments to build their position in "pure" economics against the position of Harvard essayists and the powerful position of the Eastern establishment. The fight on the terrain of economics was also a political battle against the Keynesian economists among the action intellectuals from the Eastern establishment in the Kennedy administration. They were denouncing governmental bureaucracies and policies as the product of rent-seeking behavior that led to inflation and economic stagnation.

Chicago economists in the 1950s, at a time when neo-liberal economics was still relatively weak in the United States, invested internationally. Led by Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago, they took advantage of the U.S.'s Agency for International Development (USaid) and the philanthropic foundations to invest in potential counterparts in the south, especially in the Catholic University in Santiago, Chile -- the home of the original "Chicago boys" (see Valdez 1995). The investment in Chile could be directed against the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe ("CEPAL") - - the U.N. organization in Santiago – and Raul Prebisch – himself the perfect embodiment of the well-bred cosmopolitan economist. The U.S. investment was relatively even-handed between Keynesians and neo-liberals, but Keynesian and developmentalist economics constituted the mainstream within the Chilean establishment at the University of Chile. The young economists at the Catholic University came in large numbers to Chicago, and they formed similar political alliances in Chile similar to those alliances that were being formed among conservatives in the United States. They were ready when Pinochet came to power in 1973.

They used their mathematical economics, ties with the media and especially *El Mercurio*, the Chilean analogue to the *Wall Street Journal*, and their connection to the Chicago economists, then gaining power within the economics profession in the United States, to call for "shock treatment" and a series of reforms that became the Bible for neo-liberal attacks on the interventionist state elsewhere, including Britain. The almost perfect parallel between Chicago and Catholic universities made for a remarkable story of export and import. This success, in turn, which then helped to build the credibility of the emerging Washington consensus -- and provided the basis for structural adjustment after the debt crisis and the Reagan election in the 1980s.

In Brazil, Delfim Netto, a first generation economist who gained power with the military, used the state and developmentalism against the old establishment that had

dominated the state. The second generation descendants of the establishment, exemplified by Pedro Malans, built their base at the Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro. Since economics was still relatively new in all these countries, the new generation of economists could invest abroad, and upon returning home, take over an economics department while and aligning it with the emerging global market. This new generation used U.S. economics and the legitimacy of mathematics against the strong state and relatively high inflation characteristic of the policies of Delfim Netto in the 1970s. The debt crisis further built their position.

Argentina's think tanks -- always well-connected internationally -- did not need economics to challenge the establishment or the military, but economists, led initially by Domingo Cavallo, relatively easily found their way into the international markets in economic expertise. Mathematics could be used to challenge converted lawyers like Martinez de Hoz, the Economics Minister of Argentina. In Mexico, a new generation within the PRI establishment, exemplified by Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, used economics to gain power within the state establishment and to build bridges to economists from the private schools and the private sector, such as former exemplified byMexican Finance Minister Pedro Aspe.

Groups of economists enhanced their domestic positions with the debt crisis of the 1980s. They matched very well with their counterparts negotiating the debt crisis on the other side. Drawing on their proficiency in English, their technical economics, their connections in the economics communities in the United States, and their democratic sympathies (sympathies which that the next generation of Latin American economists would also picked up while swimming in U.S. academic waters), this generation of economists became the core of the technopols celebrated in the United States. Indeed, many of the most prominent economists in Latin America met and formed friendships in the United States, especially at MIT or Harvard where much of the post-Chicago generation was educated. They became the southern side of the more democratic version of the Washington consensus.

The market integration of economic expertise has only increased in the succeeding years. It is not just that international degrees are required as a matter of course in order to make any credible claim to economic expertise, but also that it is also increasingly necessary to have held a position in the United States that provides further professional credibility -- including visiting professorships, or even tenure track appointments. One result is that there are quite a number of Latin American economists teaching and even holding tenured positions in U.S. universities, and there are many others who have had a stint at the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the senior economists who have reached

governmental positions in the south are monitoring the careers of their younger protégés teaching and publishing in the United States in order to determine their suitability for home positions, the most talented within this new generation are worried that this return home might "ruin their careers as economists. The globalization of economics thus contributes to create new incentives and channels of brain drain from the south to the north.

1.2- The globalization of human rights and the brain drain of 'moral entrepreneurs'.

After Pinochet came to power in 1973 and began to persecute those who had worked with the Allende government, a few lawyers who were sympathizers of this regime joined with the church -- which still strongly reflected the social gospel -- and sought to try some legal remedies. They had very few options in politics or the legal profession, and this alternative also provided little in the way of legal success. At that particular moment, however, Amnesty International was working assiduously to build the idea that human rights were not merely tools for political groups out of power, but reflected universals that proscribed torture and disappearance. A relatively marginal group of legal academics in the United States -- linked to Amnesty and the International Commission of Jurists -- had worked toward the same end by drawing on European principles and post-war developments such as the European Convention on Human Rights. They sought to build the credibility of human rights as international law.

The investment of these groups was recognized and augmented by the split in the foreign policy establishment in the United States. The breach in the U.S. side of the Cold War opened up new possibilities. The Democratic doves held hearings in the United States following the Pinochet coup and sought to use this human rights expertise to challenge the hawks who had supported and aided the coup. The Cold War split was found also in the Ford Foundation, where young idealists had decided after 1970 to work with the Allende regime despite the pressure of the CIA and the State Department. After the coup, they sought to protect the individuals in whom they had invested earlier. The Ford Foundation did not immediately invest in human rights, but they and the Democratic doves formed an alliance with reformers from the establishment who were now out of power. This international alliance brought together social groups which had converging interests because they occupied similar professional and political positions in the north and the south.

The alliance drew in the first instance on the shared investment in neutral social science. In Chile, human rights developed as a technical legal expertise , even if it was closely linked, personally and intellectually, to the social scientists who had worked with the Allende regime for land reform and other social programs. Both in the north and the south, the opposition actors joined with the media to build the credibility of human rights as a discourse that suited both sides perfectly. Amnesty thrived, winning the Nobel Prize in 1977, and Jimmy Carter became President in part on a human rights platform. By 1977, after the Ford Foundation Board of Trustees had visited the Vicariate in Santiago, the Ford Foundation was willing to create a program in human rights and use the Vicariate model -- which had seemed to be "curiously legalistic" -- to expand to other terrains. During the time of the Reagan administration, which was also the time of the debt crisis and the softening of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, legally-oriented human rights organizations thrived in the north and the south. Responding to the changing field of the state power in the United States, in addition, Human Rights Watch challenged Amnesty International and emerged as the leading global human rights organization.

The model from Chile exerted a great influence around the world, interacting in particular with parallel developments in Brazil and somewhat similar developments in Argentina -- where, however, the church offered no support and the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo were the only strong voice at the outset. The growing legitimacy of international human rights discourse in the late 1970s and 1980s meant also that it came to Mexico to be used by groups who aspired to employ sought to use legal expertise to challenge and to upgrade the PRI. Since "the model worked everywhere else," the philanthropic foundations also were also available to help those who wished to try this international strategy in Mexico.

Human rights organizations were a thriving form of public interest law in the 1980s throughout Latin America and the United States. The international market in human rights expertise was a plausible counterpart to the international market in economic expertise. Both were centered in the north and especially the campuses in the United States. Both were closely connected to the media and had become increasingly competitive. The human rights movement helped to make the rules for the transitions to democracy, and lawyers active in the human rights movements became key players in the new regimes.

Once the actors in the human rights movement succeeded in gaining power in Chile, Brazil and elsewhere, however, they abandoned institutions like the Vicariate in order to invest in the politics of the transition regime. The human rights movement hardly exists anymore in Chile in the sense of a movement seeking to hold the state accountable through

legal institutions. The same conclusion in general could be reached for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. For example, Raul Alfonsin in Argentina -- the first President after the military dictatorship -- came from human rights to elite party politics and the institutions of the state. In all the countries we studied, in fact, the investment of the first generation in human rights provided an excellent base for political activity after the transition. What was left behind was not replenished by a new generation eager to mimic the careers of their predecessors. The particular conjuncture that had united moral activism with law through the church and international actors did not continue. The newly created institutional structures that built the human rights NGOs unraveled, revealing the structures that had been in place prior to the 1970s.

Nevertheless, local organizations of human rights, once formed, can continue to exist in the south even if they no longer resemble what they represented earlier. Many, for example, have converted to causes and issues such as the control of crime or the prevention of violence against women. There are many more outposts of international development assistance than activist legal institutions challenging the state. Legal professionals are involved, but it is hard to see these organizations as professional analogues to public interest law.

The patterns may change over time, however, and there may be some exceptions in the south involving institutions that continue to follow the approach of moral investment in law against the State. In Brazil, for example, Viva Rio is one example of a mix between social movements, religion, politics, and law. Its activities, which grew out of the human rights movement, focus on crime, hunger, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro, and it draws on elite lawyers as well as social activists. In Chile, activities centered at the University of Diego Portales, a private university originally designed to produce business lawyers, continue to emphasize human rights and public interest law. Argentina seems to offer the most promise for cause lawyering, given since there is a long tradition of professionals investing in institutions and organizations outside the state. Such entities as Poder Ciudadano and a recent and related entity termed the Association for Civil Rights (Associacion por los Derechos Civiles or- “ADC”), which is dedicated to the protection of civil liberties in Argentina and funded primarily by the Ford Foundation, provide examples.

In contrast to the general pattern in the south, the leading international human rights organizations in the United States are thriving in the legal profession. Instead of abandoning their investment in legal expertise to join political parties and movements, human rights organizations continue to invest legal resources and techniques in the cutting edges of U.S.

foreign policy. As with power corporate lawyers in Washington, D.C., some go into the government on the basis of their experience and expertise, but the legal bases continue to thrive through their symbiotic relationship with the state.

Two further developments relate to the structural asymmetry of the present period. First, those lawyers who have continued to invest professionally in the field of human rights from the south have tended to go abroad, where their expertise and investment in international human rights remains validated and recognized. This legal morality and brain drain from the south to the north helps to legitimate the international human rights organizations based in the north. The northern organizations can use their openness -- and make certain modifications that come with that openness -- to legitimate further legitimate their positions of leadership in the field of international human rights.

1.3 Structural homologies and the relative failure of transplants

The thriving of the human rights organizations in the United States, in contrast to their absorption and reincorporation into the state in the south, is consistent with what our structural model would expect. New forms of symbolic capital tend to gravitate toward the more established and dominant symbolic banks where they can be better valued, guaranteed, and exchanged. That means in the United States that symbolic innovators continue to gravitate around the powerful and relatively autonomous professional milieux – especially given the fairly amorphous and porous U.S. state. In Chile, to make the obvious contrast, the state provides the dominant symbolic bank.

For structural reasons, therefore, the current situation reveals only a partial transplant of the U.S. professional model of legal legitimacy. The partial transplant reinforces U.S. hegemony and helps to sustain the long term prosperity of the U.S. professional model at home. International activities add a key dimension to a U.S. legal elite that combines hired guns, reformers, and public interest lawyers acting on the basis of legal noblesse oblige. In the field of human rights (as well as that of the environment and of the movement to protect women against violence), the local prestige and power of U.S. organizations draws extensively on international activities and expertises. Within national settings outside of the United States, however, there has been far more lasting success in transplanting U.S.-style business law than U.S.-style public interest law. Within the business law firms, there is a move parallel to that of the economists toward investment in the state and its institutions. The notion of professional strategies of using law against the state and business, however, which is a key ingredient of the legal field in the United States, has not been able to thrive beyond a

particular time period -- when fractions of the establishment united against the authoritarian states that evicted them from power.

The processes of professional dollarization, and the dollarization of state knowledge, captured in the shift from gentlemen lawyers to technopols, are therefore highly uneven. Elite economists can make their professional careers locally through investment in and legitimacy from the international market of expertise centered in the United States. They legitimate their superiority to the rank and file economists of their own countries while drawing on the latest economics of the campuses in the north. The U.S. professional ranking of economists outside the United States translates directly into professional prestige and recognition at home. There is a brain drain to the north, including to the World Bank and the IMF, but there is enough return traffic flows to maintain the crucial connections. We can trace the development of this international field through interactions between the north and the south that flourished in the development of the Washington consensus. The relative newness of economics as an academic institution and profession and the need to develop autonomy from law and the legal establishment helped to facilitate these developments.

The same pattern of success does not hold is not true for public interest law, despite the remarkable professional and legal success that went into the construction of the field of human rights. The institutional prosperity of public interest law in the United States draws on the model of schizophrenic corporate lawyers that developed in the nineteenth century. It is closely linked also to the role of courts and to the elite law schools in the United States. The professional role of "public interest lawyer", however, has not taken root in Latin America so far. The human rights movement fit parallel structural histories in the north and the south, but unlike the north, the south did not have institutions, such as the elite law schools and the dense networks of philanthropic foundations and professionalized NGOs, that could be used to put public interest law on a more lasting indigenous path. It remains to be seen whether this "emancipatory side" of U.S. professionalism will take root along side the successful business practice side -- and whether a joint effort might mount a real challenge to the traditional positions of the courts and the law faculties.

In both law and economics, the criteria for legitimate expertise are set according to the international market centered in the United States. There is a new global hierarchy which places elite U.S. professionals at the top (either home grown or immigrants selected through processes of brain drain from the periphery), and within each country there is also a two-tier professional hierarchy. There is a small cosmopolitan elite, who can circulate between various positions of power – as academics, politicians or entrepreneurs…- on which it has

established a quasi-monopoly. This first tier is surrounded by an increasingly provincialized mass of professionals in law, economics and other fields who have taken advantage of the expansion of educational opportunity in the post-war period has formed. The combined effect of these international and national hierarchies undermines the possibility of building autonomous professional fields in these dominated States. These hierarchies can be challenged by all those who feel excluded, and the legitimacy of states and political regimes built out of this cosmopolitan expertise is therefore always fragile.

Part II

A SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEMATIC FOR THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL FIELDS.

Taking as a starting point this finding on the importance of national settings on the processes of import and export, we have enlarged our field of investigation to take into account Asian (Dezalay, Garth, 2001,2005, 2006, forthcoming) and European developments (Dezalay, Madsen, 2006 ; Dezalay, 2007,2008). An expanded terrain brings the interplay of synchronic and diachronic dimensions to a larger historic and global canvas, leading to a more refined sociological approach having much in common with the "world system theory" developed by Wallerstein. Going beyond a comparative sociology of national professional fields, the Wallerstein-inspired perspective leads to analyses of strategies seeking to redefine the international hierarchy of expertise at the same time as they seek to build national dominance. Through this more holistic approach, international transfers of expertise appear to be determined by a double competitive logic: one which involves competing expertises seeking universal credibility, such as law versus economics, and another which represents a competition between imperialisms – where professional networks structured around the new hegemonic power compete with those built by the old "imperial societies" of Europe. (Charle, 2001). The competition in the exportation of expertise that is evident in the politics of development assistance is therefore played out in a triangular dynamic, where the "imported

states" (Badie, 1993) from the periphery represent the stakes and a laboratory to try out new technologies of governance.

World system theory provides lines of inquiry to build on the sociology of professional fields – including studies of the internationalization of the reproduction of the « state nobility » (Bourdieu, 1992) and on the genesis of the international field of state power (Bourdieu, 2000). The hyptheses and issues that derive from this sociology of globalization nicely extend Bourdieu's observations made about the "Esprits d'Etat" (1993) and the reproduction of the "Noblesses d'Etat" in the French national setting (1989). In this international competition over universals, the elites who dominate national professional fields mobilize resources of the national state -- accumulated through more or less lengthy and more or less successful investments in the construction and perpetual re-actualization of the state. The authority of these professional expertises, and thus their value on the international market of symbolic import and export, is therefore quite dependant on their homologation by state institutions.

The confrontations between different hegemonic powers seeking to diffuse their model of the state to other countries -- as a basis for an emerging international field of state power -- must be analyzed as elitist fights contributing toward the acceleration of the internationalization of the reproduction of national elites. This internationalization helps to compensate for the increased competition among national university graduates by revalorizing the linguistic and cultural capital of the descendants of the old cosmopolitan elite (Dezalay, 2004).

The diversity of the terrains and national histories upon which the struggles are fought for the recomposition of international and disciplinary hierarchies makes a summary presentation risk appearing too simplistic. Brief descriptions can ignore, for example, the subtle ways that individual and collective strategies continuously produce micro adjustments

mutually reinforcing each other. Furthermore, it is difficult to take into account strategies that play simultaneously on two registers: hegemonic politics, competition between expertises,

Importers and exporters : converging and complementary strategies ...

Conforming to the hypotheses of the "international circulation of ideas," the first task of a sociology of the globalization of professional fields is to examine international transfers through the positions that operators occupy in their respective national spaces. Exporters utilize hegemonic strategies to develop new markets for their expertise on the periphery, as was the case notably in economics with the Chicago Boys in Chile. On the other side, importers gain from opportunities to convert their social capital -- as descendants of a cosmopolitan elite -- into the most modern forms of state expertise. The acquisition of these competencies, made credible through international homologation, guarantees the importers access to leadership posts in state institutions – especially those that are at the crossroads of politics and scholarly capital, such as think tanks or their equivalents

… In a Cyclical Process.

The combination of international financial support and imported international legitimacy is typically not enough to produce programmatic success, in part because the reforms often require support and resources linked to state clientelism or even authoritarianism. That support does not come without compromises or even deals, either of which can lead imported institutions toward an unforeseen mode of operation and or even to the pursuit of unforeseen goals. This "half-failure," revealed in many cases through critical diagnoses made by international missions of experts, is also a reason for a new cycle of import-export ostensibly aimed at rectifying the errors of the prior efforts – while mobilizing the same social, learned, and political resources, and indeed benefiting essentially the same categories of agents thriving in the international market of import-export of state expertise.

This self-propelling process continues also because it is supported by waves of investment in hegemonic power, by proliferating missionaries promoting law and democracy or by entrepreneurs on behalf of development and "good governance." Rivalries between competing expertises, such as between law and economics, help fuel the cyclical process of imported reforms – in which the interests of importers and exporters are perfectly complementary.

Hegemonical competition between national exporters.

In order to complete this general scenario, it is necessary to specify in more detail the variables that influence the offerings on the international market of state expertise. The quantity and the diversity of available resources are functions of the intensity and level of competition between suppliers. The first level of competition is seen among major state powers competing for hegemony. This kind of competition was best exemplified by the Cold War conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, even during the Cold War, this level of competition was also seen to a lesser degree in more subtle transatlantic rivalries -- whereby traditional imperial societies continued to take advantage of the influence they gained through colonial ties. This level of state competition was also fueled by internal battles in aspiring hegemonic powers between different interest groups or expertises seeking to strengthen their position in their state by mobilizing disciples outside who, once trained, could become potential allies abroad. Within the United States, this internationalized local strategy was pursued especially by NGOs supported by the resources of the philanthropic foundations -- seeking to build coalitions in the service of such causes as the protection of the environment or the defense of human rights (Dezalay, Garth, 2005).

In order to examine the strategies of the exporters, it is important to take into account not only the interplay of oppositions and alliances structuring the field of power within the hegemonic powers, but also the institutions – state development organizations, philanthropic

foundations, churches or producers of learned discourse – that facilitate multiple strategies to export internal fights. In this respect, the Europe-U.S comparison is especially revealing of the influence of specific institutional channels that provide the particular form – and also the structure and package – of the international offer of expertise.

Positions and interests of importers

An identical approach can specify the factors that influence the demand on the side of the importing countries. On one side, it is necessary to take into account the perceived strategic importance of a given country at a given moment of hegemonic struggle. For example, before the threat represented by Fidel Castro led the United States to multiply its investments in Latin America and notably in Chile, the politics of U.S. philanthropic assistance had for a number of years tended to privilege Europe (Gemelli,) and Asia, especially countries considered critical outposts in the Cold War, such as Indonesia and South Korea (Parmar,… ;Ransom, 1974).

A strict geopolitical logic, however, does not suffice to explain the North-South trade and exchange in symbolic products, even taking into account the colonial ties that also played a role different from the strict Cold War competition. In particular, internal fights between different groups contending for state power have much more marked effects in the dominated countries than in the exporting countries. The new peripheral states are imported states. Contests for state power are exacerbated by the weak autonomy of many of the states -- largely because of their relatively recent origins (Badie, 1993). Autonomy is further weakened in countries where relatively short histories of the state were interrupted repeatedly by revolutions or military coups. The expertise homologized in the hegemonic societies serves as critical and perfectly legitimate weapons in contests around state institutions in peripheral states.

Military regimes and the international promotion of new comers and new technocratic expertise.

Paradoxically, authoritarian, populist, or nationalist regimes often were accompanied by an acceleration of the importation of new expertise. One reason was simply that the leaders of the new government were frequently protégés of the United States, put in place to prevent or divert social movements suspected of harboring communist sympathies. Military leaders were also often newcomers to the international scene, needing to reinforce their legitimacy through the importation of new forms of expertise, especially expertise linked to economic development. This alliance of newcomers and foreign expertise is exemplified well by the authoritarian alliances with economic technocrats. That alliance served also to justify putting aside particular predecessors and competitors, in particular the notable politicians of the law who, in most of these countries, once enjoyed a quasi-monopoly on the field of state power – and foreign relations.

Hegemonic Logic, Hierarchies of Expertise, and the International Division of Labor of Symbolic Domination

This brief discussion should suffice to show that the international circulation of state expertise cannot be fully explained by analyses of the markets of import and export of ideas. Symbolic exchanges are the product of political hegemonies that depend for their effectiveness on their strict connection with strategies for the reproduction of national elites through and around state institutions. This logic explains why the markets of expertise in public politics continue unabated whether or not earlier transfers have been successful.

The stakes go well beyond success or failure. According to the logic of the diffusion of expertises of power, claims of universalism are central parts of efforts to legitimate strategies of symbolic imperialism. Simultaneously, the expertises touch on the reproduction of national elites by legitimating their privileges through the mechanism of state governing

expertise (Bourdieu, 1993).The two sets of stakes are strictly connected. The markets in expertise assure the internationalization of the reproduction of state elites and the restructuring of national institutions – inserting both people and institutions in the new hegemonic order.